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Abstract
In this paper we analyze judgement aggregation problems in which a group of agents independently
votes on a set of complex propositions that has some interdependency constraint between them (e.g.,
transitivity when describing preferences). We generalize the previous results by studying approximate
judgement aggregation. We relax the main two constraints assumed in the current literature, Consistency
and Independence and consider mechanisms that only approximately satisfy these constraints, that is,
satisfy them up to a small portion of the inputs. The main question we raise is whether the relaxation
of these notions significantly alters the class of satisfying aggregation mechanisms. The recent works for
preference aggregation of Kalai, Mossel, and Keller fit into this framework. The main result of this paper
is that, as in the case of preference aggregation, in the case of a subclass of a natural class of aggregation
problems termed ‘truth-functional agendas’, the set of satisfying aggregation mechanisms does not extend
non-trivially when relaxing the constraints. Our proof techniques involve boolean Fourier transform and
analysis of voter influences for voting protocols.
The question we raise for Approximate Aggregation can be stated using terms of Property Testing.
For instance, as a corollary from our result we get a generalization of the classic result for property testing
of linearity of boolean functions.
Keywords: approximate aggregation, discursive dilemma, truth-functional agendas, inconsistency index,
dependency index, computational social choice
1 Introduction
1.1 Abstract Judgement Aggregation
Judgement Aggregation deals in scenarios in which one should aggregate a set of opinions/judgement done
by independent judges or agents to one opinion. For instance, assume a committee needs to decide whether
to deploy a suggested network protocol. It is acceptable by all voters that the protocol should be deployed if
and only if it stands in two criteria: security (resistance to attacks) and scalability (supports several sizes of
a network). We assume that each voter decides his opinion on the two criteria independently and based on
this decides on whether to deploy the protocol. The voters cast their votes simultaneously and we assume
no strategic behavior on their behalf. Now assume that a third of the voters are convinced that the protocol
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stands in the two criteria and hence think it should be deployed while the other voters think it should not
be deployed but disagree on the criterion that is violated. One third of the voters think it is not secure
enough and hence should not be deployed although it is scalable. On the other hand, a third of the voters
think it is secure but not scalable enough and hence should not be deployed. Then we have that although a
minority of the committee (a third of the voters) thinks the protocol should be deployed, for each criterion
separately there is a supporting majority (two thirds) that thinks the protocol passes. This discrepancy
between the majority vote on premises (security and scalability) and the majority vote on the conclusion
(deploy) was presented by Kornhauser and Sager in 1986[28] and was later named ‘The Doctrinal Paradox’.
The deploy-network scenario is an example for a case when the decision is based on several arguments
(while the logical connection between the arguments and the decision is commonly accepted) and we need
to aggregate the decisions of (many) individuals into one decision. In general, one can think of scenarios in
which the accepted opinions do not have this premise-conclusion structure ,for instance the Arovian agenda
of preferences. A discrepancy phenomena as described above can happen for a lot of such sets of ‘accepted
opinions’ (e.g., Condorcet Paradox for preference aggregation) and is the subject of a growing body of works
in economics, political science, philosophy, law, and other related disciplines. (A survey of this field can
be found in [32] and [30]) Abstract aggregation is the field that deals with such problems that arise when
aggregating several opinions (constrained to be in some given group, the agenda) to one opinion. It can be
formalized in the following way. There is a committee of n individuals (also called voters) that needs to
decide on m binary issues (that is, each question has exactly two possible answers True and False1). Each
individual holds an opinion which is an answer for each of the issues. We denote the answer of the ith voter
for the jth issue by Xji and the vector of all opinions in the committee (called profile) by X ∈ ({0, 1}
m)n
(For the ease of presentation we will identify True with 1 and False with 0). Like in the example above,
not all opinions are acceptable (one cannot accept a network protocol if it is not secure). We assume a
non-empty set X of {0, 1}m called the agenda is given. The opinions in X are called the consistent
opinions and only these opinions are held by voters2. For instance the conjunction agenda, which is the
agenda described in the example, is defined to be the set {000, 010, 100, 111}3. A related model (that is more
common in the literature) is ‘Judgement Aggregation’. In this model the issues are logical propositions over
a set of variables and a consistent opinion is an assignment to these variables (so not every combination of
truth values for the proposition is achievable). We feel that the logical model is more suitable in cases where
one searches for aggregation mechanisms that respect the semantics of the agenda (which is represented by
the propositions). Since our work can be stated as impossibility results, we prefer using the more general
model. In [16] Dokow and Holzman prove that the two models are equivalent in the sense that each set of
consistent opinions can be described using a proposition set (although not uniquely).
An aggregation mechanism is a function that defines for any profile the aggregated opinion
(F : ({0, 1}m)n→{0, 1}m). In this work we concentrate on two properties of aggregation mechanisms, which
were the first to be studied, independence and consistency. Independence states that the aggregated
opinion on the jth issue, (F (X))j depends solely on the opinions on that issue Xj . For instance, issue-wise
majority that was presented above satisfies independence. Consistency of the aggregation mechanism
states that whenever all the members of the committee hold consistent opinions, i.e., X ∈ Xn, F returns
a consistent opinion as well, i.e., F (X) ∈ X. For instance, for the conjunction agenda issue-wise majority
, as can be seen in the deploy-protocol example, does not satisfy consistency. The consistency criterion is
commonly accepted as regarding a system of agents as an agent and hence requiring it the same rationality
constraint we require from the individual agents. For instance, firms(in which decisions are formed by ag-
gregating opinions of different board members) act as a unit and it matters to the firms‘s credibility if it can
be expected to behave coherently. The independence criterion, while not being uncontroversial, has some
1There is some literature on aggregating non-binary issues, e.g., [43] and [18], but this is outside the scope of this paper.
2For instance those might be the legal opinions, logic consistent opinions, or rational according to other criterion so one can
assume that any ‘reasonable’ individual should hold only consistent opinions.
3I.e., the third bit ia a conjunction of the first two.
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appeal in that it guarantees a proposition-wise approach to aggregation. In section 2.1 we discuss further
this criterion and claim that it can be justified in many scenarios.
A natural question is to characterize the aggregation mechanisms that satisfy independence and con-
sistency (for a given agenda). For the conjunction agenda (under mild and natural constraint4) the only
aggregation mechanisms that satisfy independence and consistency are the oligarchies (The oligarchy of a
coalition S returns for each issue True iff all voters in S voted True for that issue). Since, the set of consistent
and independent aggregation mechanisms is small and unnatural this characterization theorem is referenced
as an impossibility result. Such impossibility results are quite strong. They shows the impossibility of
finding any aggregation mechanism that satisfies the conditions. In other words: for each mechanism there
will always be some judgement profiles that lead to a breakdown of the mechanism. In this work we deal
with this point (and we think we even strengthening the impossibility result) by quantifying the number of
profiles that lead to such breakdown.
For the conjunction agenda we prove:
Theorem. 5 For any ǫ > 0, n > 1, δ < Cn−2ǫ4 (for some constant C that does not depend on n), no
aggregation mechanism F for the conjunction agenda over n voters satisfies the following five conditions:
• F is δ-close to being independent.
I.e., there exists an independent (not necessarily consistent) aggregation mechanism G that returns the
same aggregated opinion as F for at least (1− δ) fraction of the profiles.
• F is δ-close to being consistent.
I.e., F returns a consistent result for at least (1− δ) fraction of the profiles.
• F is ǫ-far from returning always False on one of the basic premises.
– F returns True as an aggregated opinion for the first issue for at least at least ǫ fraction of the
profiles.
– F returns True as an aggregated opinion for the second issue for at least at least ǫ fraction of the
profiles.
• F is ǫ-far from being an oligarchy.
I.e., for any oligarchy G of a coalition S, F returns the same aggregated opinion as G for at most
(1− ǫ) fraction of the profiles.
In this paper we prove similar theorems for a family of agendas: truth-functional agendas in which
every issue is either a premise or a conclusion defined as conjunction or xor of several premises (up to
input & output negation). In a truth-functional agenda the issues are divided into two types: premises and
conclusions. Each conclusion j is characterized by a binary function Φj over the premises and an opinion is
consistent if the answers to the conclusion issues are attained by applying the function Φj on the answers
to the premise issues.
X =
{
x ∈ {0, 1}m xj = Φj(premises) for every conclusion issue j.
}
For instance the conjunction agenda is a truth-functional agenda with two premises and one conclusion and
we mark this by notating the agenda as 〈A,B,A ∧B〉. We restrict ourselves to truth-functional agendas in
which the conclusions are either conjunction or xor up to negation of inputs and outputs6.
4Voter Sovereignty - For each issue, there a profile for which the aggregated opinion will be False and a profile for which
the aggregated opinion will be True.
5This is a special case of corollary 6.2.
6E.g., A ∧ B and A ∧B, A⊕B⊕C
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1.2 Approximate Judgement Aggregation
Lately there is a series of works coping with impossibility results in Social Choice using approximations
(e.g., [7] and [22]). The version of approximation we define in this work is studying aggregation mechanisms
that are almost consistent and almost independent. We quantify being almost consistent by defining δ-
consistency of an aggregation mechanism as having a consistent aggregation mechanism G that disagrees
with F on at most δ fraction of the inputs7. Similarly, we quantify being almost independent by defining
δ-independence of an aggregation mechanism as having an independent aggregation mechanism that
disagrees with F on at most δ fraction of the inputs. Both terms can be equivalently defined as the failure
probability of tests as we show in section 2 and actually the second versions of the definitions are those we
use in the analysis since they are easier to work with.
Both definitions use the Hamming distance dX(F,G) = Pr [F (X) 6= G(X) | X ∈ Xn] which includes an
assumption of uniform distribution over the opinions for each voter and that voters draw their opinions
independently (Impartial Culture Assumption). This assumption, while certainly unrealistic, is the
natural choice in this kind of work and is discussed further in section 2.
Trivially, if F is close to G and G is independent and consistent, F is δ-independent and δ-consistent
for δ linear in d(F,G). Our main question is whether there are aggregation mechanisms that are close to
being independent and consistent that are not close the (usually small) set of consistent and independent
aggregation mechanisms.
In several agendas the set of consistent independent aggregation mechanisms is a very small set(E.g.,
dictatorship or oligarchies) and hence this question is equivalent to asking whether we can look for aggre-
gation mechanisms that are close to being independent and close to being consistent without collapsing to
the known small (perturbed) set of consistent independent aggregation mechanisms.
1.3 Connection to Approximate Preference Aggregation
Preceded our work is the works by Kalai[24], Mossel[35], and Keller[25] that proved similar approximate
aggregation theorems for preference aggregation. In this agenda the consistent opinions represent the
linear orders over a set of candidates {c1, c2, . . . , cs} and the issues are the
(s
2
)
pair-wise comparisons between
candidates8.Similarly to the doctrinal paradox, the Condorcet Paradox[10] shows that issue-wise majority
might lead to an inconsistent result for preference aggregation as well. Arrow’s theorem[1] shows that (under
mild and natural constraint9) the only aggregation mechanisms that satisfy independence and consistency
are the dictatorships.
The recent works of Kalai[24], Mossel[35], and Keller[25] proved similar results to the results we prove
here.
Theorem ([25]). There exists an absolute constant C such that the following holds: For any ǫ > 0 and k > 3,
if f is an aggregation mechanism for the preference agenda over k candidates that satisfies independence
and C ·
(
ǫ/k2
)3
-consistency, , then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satisfies independence and
consistency such that d(F,G) < ǫ.
Using the technique we show in this paper (theorem 7.4), one can generalize this result for characterizing
the δ-independent δ-consistent aggregation mechanisms for preference mechanisms.
7Formally, Pr [F (X) 6= G(X) | X ∈ Xn] 6 δ.
8For instance, for s=3 (three candidates) the issues are ‘c1
?
>c2’, ‘c2
?
>c3’, and ‘c3
?
>c1’ and the consistent opinions are
{001,010,100,110,101,011}.
9Pareto - Whenever all the voters hold the same opinion, this is the aggregated opinion.
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1.4 Connection to Property Testing
We think it is useful to phrase the question of approximate aggregation using terms of property testing. In
this field we query a function at a small number of (random) points testing for a global property (In our
case, the property is being a consistent independent aggregation mechanism). We discuss this connection
further is section 5. For example a corollary of the results we present in this paper (in property testing
terms):
For any three binary functions f, g, h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, if
Pr[f(x)⊕ g(y) = h(x⊕ y)] > 1− ǫ
(when the addition is in Z2 and Z
n
2 , respectively), then there exists three binary functions
f ′, g′, h′ : {0, 1}n→{0, 1} such that Pr[f(x) 6=f ′(x)], Pr[g(x) 6=g′(x)], and Pr[h(x) 6=h′(x)] are smaller
than Cǫ for some constant C independent of n and
∀x, y : f ′(x)⊕ g′(y) = h′(x⊕ y).
Notice a special case of this result (for f = g = h) is the classic result of Blum, Luby, and Rubinfeld ([4],
[2]) for linear testing of boolean functions.
1.5 Techniques
We prove the main theorem by proving the specific case of independent aggregation mechanism for two
basic agenda families: the conjunction agendas (agendas in which there is exactly one conclusion with is
constrained to be the conjunction of the premises. 7.1) and the xor agendas (agendas in which there is
exactly one conclusion with is constrained to be the xor of the premises. theorem 7.3). Later we show how
to extend these theorems to the general theorem of relaxing both constraints (theorem 7.4).
We use two different techniques in the proofs. For the conjunction agendas we study influence measures10
of voters on the issue-aggregating functions and for the xor agendas we use Fourier analysis of the issue-
aggregating functions.
An open question is whether one can find such bounds for any agenda or whether there exists an agenda
for which the class of aggregation mechanisms that satisfy consistency and independence expands non
trivially when we relax the consistency and independence constraints.
We proceed to describe the structure of the paper. In Section 2 we describe the formal model of aggre-
gation mechanisms. In section 3 we give present the main agendas we deal with, truth-functional agendas,
and specifically conjunction agendas and xor agendas. In section 4 we state the motivation to deal with
approximate aggregation, and describe the known results for preference approximate aggregation by Kalai,
Mossel, and Keller. In section 5 we describe the connection we find between Approximate Aggregation and
the field of Property Testing. In sections 6 and 7 we describe our main theorems and outline the proof.
Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
We define the model similarly to [16] (which is Rubinstein and Fishburn’s model [43] for the binary case)
We consider a committee of n individuals that needs to decide on m issues. An opinion is a vector
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ {0, 1}
m denoting an answer to each of the issues. An opinion profile is a matrix
10Both the known influence (Banzhaf power index) and a new measure we define: The ignorability of a voter.
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X ∈ ({0, 1}m)n denoting the opinions of the committee members so an entry Xji denotes the vote of the i
th
voter for the jth issue, the ith row of it Xi states the votes of the i
th individual on all issues, and the jth
column of it Xj states the votes of each of the individuals on the jth issue. In addition we assume that an
agenda X ∈ {0, 1}m of the consistent opinions is given.
The basic notion in this field is an aggregation mechanism which is a function that returns an
aggregated opinion (not necessarily consistent) for every profile (F : ({0, 1}m)n → {0, 1}m)11.
An aggregation mechanism satisfies Independence (and we say that the mechanism is independent)
if for any two consistent profiles X and Y and an issue j, if Xj = Y j (all individuals voted the same
on the jth issue in both profiles) then (F (X))j = (F (Y ))j (the aggregated opinion for the jth issue is the
same for both profiles). This means that F satisfies independence if one can find m binary functions
f1, f2, . . . , fm : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} s.t. F (X) ≡
(
f1(X1), f2(X2), . . . , fm(Xm)
)
12. An independent aggrega-
tion mechanism satisfies systematicity if F (X) =
〈
f(X1), . . . , f(Xm)
〉
for some issue aggregating function
f , i.e., all issues are aggregated using the same function. We will use the notation
〈
f1, f2, . . . , fm
〉
for the
independent aggregation mechanism that aggregates the jth issue using f j.
The main two measures we study in this paper are the inconsistency index ICX(F ) and the depen-
dence index DIX(F ) of a given aggregation mechanism F and a given agenda X. These measures are
relaxations of the consistency and independence criterion that are usually assumed in current works13.
We define the measures by
Definition 2.1 (Inconsistency Index).
For an agenda X and an aggregation mechanism F for that agenda, the inconsistency index is defined
to be the probability to get an inconsistent result.
ICX(F ) = Pr [F (X) /∈ X | X ∈ Xn] .
Definition 2.2 (dependency index).
For an agenda X and an aggregation mechanism F for that agenda, the dependency vector DIj,X(F ) is
defined as
DIj,X(F ) = E
X∈Xn
[
Pr
Y ∈Xn
[
(F (X))j 6= (F (Y ))j |Xj = Y j
]]
.
The definition can be seen as a test for independence of the jth issue as discussed in section 5
The dependency index DIX(F ) is defined by
DIX(F ) = max
j=1,...,m
DIj,X(F )
In contexts where the agenda is clear we omit the agenda superscript and notate these as IC(F ), DIj(F ),
and DI(F ), respectively.
We define these two indexes using local tests. We prove that the more natural definition of distance to
he class of aggregation mechanisms that satisfy consistence (or independence) is equivalent to the above (up
to multiplication by δ by constant).
Proposition 2.3. Let F be an aggregation mechanism for an agenda over m issues. Then F satisfies
IC(F ) 6 δ iff there exists a consistent aggregation mechanism H that satisfies d(F,H) 6 δ.
11We define the function for all profiles for simplicity but we are not interested in the aggregated opinion in cases one of the
voters voted an inconsistent opinion.
12Notice this property is a generalization of the IIA property for social welfare functions (aggregation mechanism for the
preference agenda) so a social welfare function satisfies IIA iff it satisfies independence as defined here (when the issues are the
pair-wise comparisons).
13F satisfies consistency iff IC(F ) = 0 and independence iff DI(F ) = 0
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Proposition 2.4. Let F be an aggregation mechanism and j an issue. If DIj(F ) 6 ǫ, then there exists
an aggregation mechanism H that satisfies DIj(H) = 0 and d(F,H) 6 2ǫ. If DIj(F ) > ǫ, then every
aggregation mechanism H that satisfies DIj(H) = 0, also satisfies d(F,H) > 12ǫ
Proposition 2.5. Let F be an aggregation mechanism for an agenda over m issues that satisfies DI(F ) 6 δ.
Then there exists an independent aggregation mechanism H that satisfies d(F,H) 6 2mδ.
These definitions include two major assumptions on the opinion profile distribution. First, we assume
the voters pick their opinions independently and from the same distribution. Second, we assume a uniform
distribution over the (consistent) opinions for each voter (Impartial Culture Assumption). The uni-
form distribution assumption, while certainly unrealistic, is the natural choice for proving ‘lower bounds’
on IC(F ). That is, proving results of the format ‘Every aggregation mechanism of a given class has in-
consistency index of at least γ(n)’. In particular, the lower bound, up to a factor δ, applies also to any
distribution that gives each preference profile at least a δ fraction of the probability given by the uniform
distribution.14Note that we cannot hope to get a reasonable bound result for every distribution. For in-
stance, since for every aggregation mechanism we can take a distribution on profiles for which it returns a
consistent opinion.
2.1 The Independence Property
The independence criterion is sometimes criticized as being unjustified normatively in most real-life scenar-
ios15. The impossibility results of judgement aggregation can also be seen as ‘empirical’ argument against
independence since they show that it contradicts the more natural assumption of consistency. While we
accept this argument, we think our work quantifies the tradeoff between the two criteria. Moreover, in this
section we claim that in the general case this criterion can be justified on several different grounds.
First, in a lot of cases it is justified to expect due to normative or legal reasons that changing an individual
judgement on an issue should not change the collective judgement on another issue.
Secondly, there are works that defend this criterion by using manipulation-resistance arguments. In [15]
Dietrich and List define the notion of manipulability of an aggregation mechanism16 and proved that any
aggregation mechanism that does not satisfy independence is manipulable. In this paper they further prove
that this manipulability property is equivalent to a more game-theoretic property of strategy-proofness
under some assumptions on players’ preferences.
On the ground of simplicity of representation one can justify independence as a criterion that returns
aggregation mechanisms that are easy to represent, calculate, or justify (For instance, justify a voting method
to the public).
Other grounds of justification for such aggregation mechanisms are from the voter point of view. There
might be a situations in which the decisions are made over time (different meetings) or place (different
representatives of the same voting identity) so it is fair to assume that when voting on an issue or aggregating
the votes it is unreasonable to depend on votes on other issues. Another argument might be than there
are scenarios in which you need to define the aggregation method and only at a later stage choose from the
14In successive works we relax this assumption and prove similar results for more general distributions.
15Chapman([8]) and Mongin([34]) attack this criterion and claim it removes the discipline of reason from social choice since
it disregards the intra-issue dependencies which is the essence of the problem. According to this criterion the aggregation of
‘complex’ issues is done without regarding the reasons of the voters for their opinions and hence lacks the information for good
aggregation.
16An aggregation mechanism F is manipulable at the profile X by individual i(the manipulator) on issue j if Xij 6= (F (X))j
(The manipulator disagrees with the aggregated opinion on issue j), but Xij = (F (X
′))
j
for some profile X ′ that differs form
X in i‘s vote only.(I.e. the manipulator can get his will on j by voting differently)
set of issues the relevant one (For instance, the definition of Social Welfare Functions as returning a choice
function so only at a later stage the society is faced with the menu of alternatives).
2.2 Binary Functions
Since this work deals with binary functions (for aggregating issues), we need to define several notions for
this framework as well. To ease the presentation, throughout this paper we will identify True with 1 and
False with 0 and use logical operators on bits and bit vectors (using entry-wise semantics).
Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a binary function. f is the oligarchy of a coalition S if it is of the form:
f(x) =
∏
i∈S
xi. This means that f returns 1 if all the members of S voted 1. We denote by Olig the class of
all 2n oligarchies. Two special cases of oligarchies are the constant 1 function which is the oligarchy of the
empty coalition and the dictatorships which are oligarchies of a single voter.
f is a linear function if it is of the form f(x) = ⊕
i∈S
xi for some coalition S
17. This means that f returns
1 if an even number of the members of S voted 1. We denote by Lin the class of all 2n linear functions.
Two special cases of linear functions are the constant 1 function which is the xor function over the empty
coalition and the dictatorships which are xor of a single voter.
We say that f satisfies the Pareto criterion if f(0¯) = 0 and f(1¯) = 118. I.e., when all the individuals
voted unanimously 0 then f should return 0 and similarly for the case of 1.
We define two measures for the influence of an individual on a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Both
definitions use the uniform distribution over {0, 1}n (which is consistent with the assumption we have on
the profile distribution).
• The influence19 of a voter i on f is defined to be the probability that he can flip the result by changing
his vote.
Ii(f) = Pr[f(x) 6= f(x⊕ ei)]
(x⊕ ei : ei = the i
th elementary vector. It is equivalent to flipping the ith bit 0↔ 1)
• The (zero-)ignorability of a voter i on f is defined to be the probability that f returns 1 when i
voted 0.
Pi(f) = Pr[f(x) = 1 | xi = 0]
(We did not find a similar index defined in the voting literature or in the cooperative games literature).
In addition we define a distance function over the binary functions. The distance between two functions
f, g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is defined to be the probability of getting a different result (normalized Hamming
distance). d(f, g) = Pr [f(x) 6= g(x)]. From this measure we will derive a distance from a function to a set
of functions by d(f,G) = min
g∈G
d(f, g)
One more notation we are using in this paper is x
J
for a binary vector x ∈ {0, 1}n and a coalition
J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . n} for notating the entries of x that correspond to J .
17An equivalent definition is: ∀x, y : f(x)+f(y) = f(x+y) when the addition is in Z2 and Z
n
2 , respectively.
18In the literature this criterion is sometimes referred to as Unanimity, e.g., in [32]. We choose to follow [17] and refer to it
as Pareto to distinguish between it and the unanimity function which is the oligarchy of {1, 2, . . . , n}.
19In the simple cooperative games regime, this is also called the Banzhaf power index of player i in the game f .
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3 Agenda Examples
A lot of natural problems can be formulated in the framework of aggregation mechanisms. It is natural
to divide the agendas to two major classes Truth-Functional Agendas and Non Truth-Functional
Agendas.
3.1 Truth-Functional Agendas
In a truth-functional agenda the issues are divided into two types: k premises and (m− k) conclusions. The
conclusion issues are binary functions over the k premises, Φ : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}m−k . An opinion is consistent
if the answers to the conclusion issues are attained by applying the function Φ on the premise issues.
X =
{
x ∈ {0, 1}m xj = Φj(x1, . . . , xk) j = k + 1, . . . ,m
}
There are cases in which there might be more than one way to classify the issues to premises and conclusions.
For instance, the 2-premises xor agenda described below X = {001, 010, 100, 111} can be defined both as
〈A,B,A⊕B〉 and as 〈A,A⊕C,C〉. Since we choose to analyze the agenda as opinion sets (and not as a
proposition set) we do not handle this point and notice that it is irrelevant for our results.
These agendas ,due their structure, seems to be a good point to start our work on approximate aggregation
and in this paper we prove basic results for the following two families of truth-functional agendas. Later we
derive results to a more general family of truth-functional agendas.
3.1.1 Conjunction Agendas
In the (m-premises) conjunction agenda
〈
A1, . . . , Am,
m
∧
j=1
Aj
〉
there are m+ 1 issues to decide on and the
consistency criterion is defined to be that the last issue is a conjunction of the other issues. For instance
the Doctrinal Paradox agenda is the 2-premises conjunction agenda. A common description of the problem
is of a group of judges or jurors that should decide whether a defendant is liable under a charge of breach
of contract. Each of them should decide on three issues: whether the contract was valid (p), whether there
was a breach (q) and whether the defendant is liable (r). In their decision making they are constrained by
the legal doctrine that the defendant is only liable if the contract was valid and if there was indeed a breach
(r ⇐⇒ (p ∧ q)).
3.1.2 Xor Agendas
Similarly, in the (m-premises) xor agenda
〈
A1, . . . , Am,
m
⊕
j=1
Aj
〉
there are m+ 1 issues to decide on and the
consistency criterion is defined to be that the third issue is True if the number of true-valued opinions for
the first m is even. An equivalent way to define this agenda is constraining the number of True answers to
be odd.
3.2 Non Truth-Functional Agendas
One can think on a lot of agendas that cannot be represented as a truth-functional agenda. Among such
interesting natural agendas that were studied one can find the equivalence agenda[21], the membership
agenda [42][33], and the preference agenda described below.
9
3.3 Preference Aggregation
Aggregation of preferences is one of the oldest aggregation frameworks studied. In this framework there are
s candidates and each individual holds a full strict order over them. We are interested in Social Welfare
Functions which are functions that aggregate n such orders to an aggregated order. As seen in [36] and [12],
this problem can be stated naturally in our framework by defining
(s
2
)
issues20.
4 Motivation & Known Results
We find the motivation for dealing with the field of approximate aggregation in three different disciplines.
• The consistent characterization are often regarded as ‘impossibility results’ in the sense that they
‘permit’ a very restrictive set of aggregation mechanisms. (e.g., Arrow’s theorem tells us that there is
no ‘reasonable’ way to aggregate preferences). Extending these theorems to approximate aggregation
characterizations sheds light on these impossibility results by relaxing the constraints.
• The questions of Aggregation Theory have often roots in Philosophy, Law, and Political Science. There
is a long line of works suggesting consistent aggregating mechanisms while still trying to stay ‘reason-
ably close’ to independence. The main general (not agenda-tailored) suggestions are premise-based
mechanisms and conclusion-based aggregation for truth-functional agendas(see, among others, [28] [27]
[39] [31] [13] [6]), and a generalization of them to non-truth-functional agendas called sequential prior-
ity aggregation([29], [14]). Another procedure in the literature is the distance-based aggregation([40])
which is a well known for preference aggregation (E.g., Kemeny voting rule[26], Dodgson voting rule[3],
and lately a more systematic analysis in [19]). Our work contribute to this discussion by pointing out
where one should search for solutions while not leaving the consistency and independence constraints
entirely.
• Connections to Property Testing as discussed in section 5
The first work studying approximate aggregation was done for the preference agenda over three candidate
by Kalai[24] (although without stating the general framework of approximate aggregation). This work was
generalized by Mossel[35], and Keller[25].
Theorem ([25] theorem 1.3). There exists an absolute constant C such that the following holds: For any
ǫ > 0 and k > 3, if f is an aggregation mechanism for the preference agenda over k candidates that satisfies
independence and C ·
(
ǫ/k2
)3
-consistency, , then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satisfies
independence and consistency such that d(F,G) < ǫ.
5 Connection to Property Testing
In the words of [41], the field of property testing deals with the following:
Given the ability to perform (local) queries concerning a particular object (e.g., a function or a graph),
the task is to determine whether the object has a predetermined (global) property (e.g., linearity or
bipartiteness), or is far from having the property. The task should be performed by inspecting only a
small (possibly randomly selected) part of the whole object, where a small probability of failure is allowed.
Property testing trades accuracy (the distance parameter) for efficiency (number of queries).
We think it is useful to view the Approximate Aggregation problem in the framework of Property Testing.
Below we highlight the connection between Approximate Aggregation and a special case of Property testing
20The issue 〈i, j〉 (for i<j) represents whether an individual prefers ci over cj .
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termed ‘one-sided non-adaptive program testing’. For a general survey of the field, one can read [20], [41],
and [23].
In our case the global property we are trying to test is ‘consistency and independence’ of an aggregation
mechanism. The class of satisfying aggregation mechanism is characterized by the current state of research.
It is clear that each of the components of this property separately, consistency and independence of an issue,
can be tested trivially. The consistency test consists of picking a (consistent) profile uniformly at random
and checking whether the aggregated opinion is consistent. The test for independence of issue j consists
of picking a (consistent) profile uniformly at random altering the opinion for each voter without changing
the jth bit and check whether the aggregated opinion on the jth issue is changed due to the altering. For
each of the two tests the probability to accept a non-satisfying mechanism is linear in the distance to the
satisfying set (and equals IC(F ) and DIj(F ), respectively). The main question of this work (in property
testing terms) can be stated as follows: What is the best test for being ‘consistent and independent’ one can
assemble from running the (m+1) tests as black boxes (and therefore get information only on IC(F ) and
DIj(F )). Similar question was asked lately in [9]. In [9] the authors query (among other similar questions)
the conditions needed in order to deduce from testability of two properties the testability of the intersection
of the two properties. Our work can be seen as studying this question for a specific domain in which the
question seems to be natural and while adding the constraint that the test of the intersection property
should be defined as a sequence of tests for the basic properties.
The main result of this paper is that for a class of mechanisms (corresponding to a natural class of
agendas) one can assemble those tests to a test for the property ‘consistent and independent’.
Similarly one can state questions dealing with sub-families of aggregation mechanisms. For example, as we
stated in the introduction, the classic result of Blum, Luby, and Rubinfeld for linearity testing of boolean
functions is a direct corollary of our result for the 2-premises xor agenda when considering systematic
aggregation mechanisms.
Still, the target of the two fields is different. While Property Testing deals with finding the most
efficient (query-wise) algorithm for testing a property (functions family), Approximate Aggregation deals
with analyzing a specific family of tests.
6 Main Results
The main result of this paper is
Theorem 6.1.
For any ǫ > 0 and m,n > 1, there exists δ
IC
, δ
DI
= n−2
(
ǫ
m
)poly(m)
, such that for every truth-functional
agenda X over m issues, in which each non-premise issue is defined to be either conjunction of several
premises or xor of several premises(up to negation of inputs or output)21, if F is an aggregation mechanism
for X over n voters satisfying δ-independence and δ-consistency, then there exists an aggregation mechanism
G that satisfies consistency and independence such that d(F,G) < ǫ
Moreover, one can take δ
IC
= n−2
(
(1−βǫ)ǫ
5m
)m2+m−1
−βǫǫ and δDI =
1
2mβǫǫ for any βǫ ∈
[
0, n−2
(
ǫ
m
)m2+m−1]
.
A direct corollary is the following impossibility result.
Corollary 6.2. For any m,n > 1 and ǫ, δ ∈ [0, 1] s.t. δ < n−2
(
ǫ
10m
)m2+m−1
, ,and a truth-functional agenda
X over m issues, in which each non-premise issue is defined to be either conjunction of several premises
or xor of several premises(up to negation of inputs or output), no aggregation mechanism F for X over n
voters satisfies the following three conditions:
21For example 〈A,B,A ∧B〉, 〈A,B,A→ B〉 ≡
〈
A,B,A ∧B
〉
, 〈A,B,C,A ∧B,B⊕C,A ∨ C〉.
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• δ-independence
• δ-consistency
• F is ǫ-far from any independent and consistent aggregation mechanism for X .
In the case of xor agenda (and its generalization, a truth-functional agenda in which all the conclusions
are xor) we can get a much better result (e.g., no dependence on the number of voters)
Theorem 6.3. Let m > 3 and let the agenda be X =
〈
A1, . . . , Am−1,
m−1
⊕
j=1
Aj
〉
. For any ǫ < 16 and any
aggregation mechanism F :
If F is an aggregation mechanism for X over n voters satisfying ǫ-independence and ǫ-consistency,
then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satisfies consistency and independence such that
d(F,G) < m(2m+ 3)ǫ
Noticing that any affine agenda (i.e., an agenda that is an affine subspace) can be represented as a
truth-functional agenda that uses xor conclusions only (lemma C.5) we can get the following corollary
Corollary 6.4. For any ǫ > 0 and m,n > 1, there exists δ = ǫm(2m+3) , such that for every affine agenda
X over m issues, if F is an aggregation mechanism for X over n voters satisfying δ-independence and
δ-consistency, then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satisfies consistency and independence
such that d(F,G) < ǫ
7 Proof Sketch of the Main Theorem
In this section we sketch the techniques behind our proofs. The full proofs can be found in the appendices.
We prove the main theorem by proving three independent theorems. An approximation result for in-
dependent aggregation mechanisms for conjunction agendas (theorem 7.1). An approximation result for
independent aggregation mechanisms for xor agendas (theorem 7.3). An agenda independent method of
converting results for the independent case to the general case of relaxing both constraints (theorem 7.4).
Using induction on the number of conclusions and noticing that negating (of the inputs and of the output)
is renaming of opinions in our framework (and hence does not change the approximation results) we get
theorem 6.1.
7.1 Conjunction Agenda
For the agenda
〈
A1, . . . , Am,
m
∧
j=1
Aj
〉
we prove:
Theorem 7.1. Let m > 2 and let the agenda be X =
〈
A1, . . . , Am,
m
∧
j=1
Aj
〉
.
For any ǫ > 0 and any independent aggregation mechanism F :
If IC(F ) 6 ǫ, then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satisfies consistency and independence
such that d(F,G) < 5m
(
n2ǫ
) 1
m2+m−1 .
Technique: The main insight in the proof is that for any two different issue-aggregating functions, f
and g, in F for two of the m premises, we can bound the product of the influence of a voter on f and the
ignorability of the same voter for g using the inconsistency index of F by Pi(f) · Ii(g) 6 4IC(F ).
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Proof sketch.
Let F = 〈f, g, h〉 be an aggregation mechanism that satisfies IC(F ) 6 ǫ. In case that f (or g) is close
enough to the constant zero function, F is close to the consistent aggregation mechanism 〈0, g, 0〉.
Otherwise, we define for a given function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and a coalition J (the junta), the junta
function f→J : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}. It is derived from f in the following way:
f→J(x) = majority {f(y) | yJ = xJ} .
I.e., for a given input, f→J reads only the votes of the junta members, iterates over all the possible votes for
the members outside the junta, and returns the more frequent result (assuming uniform distribution over
the votes of the voters outside J).
We define f→J and g→J with regard to the junta of all the voters with small ignorability for either f or g.
J =
{
i Pi(f) 6
∆
n
}
∪
{
i Pi(g) 6
∆
n
}
,
We prove that f→J and g→J are close to f and g, respectively and that there exists an issue aggregation
function h⋆ such that 〈f→J , g→J , h
⋆〉 is a consistent aggregation mechanism that is close to F .
There is a known characterization of the consistent independent aggregation mechanism for the conjunc-
tion agenda. (This characterization is a direct corollary from a series of works in the more general framework
of aggregation, E.g., [37], [16]. We include a proof of it in the appendix)
Lemma 7.2.
Let f, g, h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be three voting functions satisfying IC(〈f, g, h〉) = 0. Then either f = h ≡ 0, or
g = h ≡ 0, or f = g = h ∈ Olig.
A corollary from this theorem and theorem 7.1 is a characterization of the approximate aggregation
mechanisms for this agenda. Actually ,in the proof of theorem 7.1 we get a tighter characterization that
distinguishes between the two cases of consistent independent aggregation mechanism.
7.2 Xor Agenda
For the agenda
〈
A1, . . . , Am−1,
m−1
⊕
j=1
Aj
〉
we prove:
Theorem 7.3. Let m > 3 and let the agenda be X =
〈
A1, . . . , Am−1,
m−1
⊕
j=1
Aj
〉
.
For any ǫ< 16 and any independent aggregation mechanism F : If IC(F )6ǫ, then there exists an aggre-
gation mechanism G that satisfies consistency and independence such that d(F,G)6mǫ.
Technique22: The proof uses the Fourier representation of the issue aggregating functions. That is,
representing the functions as linear combinations of the linear boolean functions.
Proof sketch.
Given an independent aggregation mechanism F = 〈f, g, h〉 we analyze the expression E[f(x)g(y)h(xy)]
when x and y are sampled uniformly and independently. On one hand we show that
E[f(x)g(y)h(xy)] = 1−2IC(F ). On the other hand we show that E[f(x)g(y)h(xy)] =
∑
χ∈Lin
f̂(χ)ĝ(χ)ĥ(χ)
when
∣∣∣f̂(χ)∣∣∣ equals 1−2min (d (f, χ) , d (f,−χ)). Hence, when IC(F ) is small then this sum is close to one
22The proof is similar to the analysis of the BLR (Blum-Luby-Rubinfeld) linearity test done in [2].
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and hence there exists a linear function such that f ,g, and h are close to it (up to negation). Noticing
that for any linear function χ, 〈χ, χ, χ〉 and the permutations of 〈−χ,−χ, χ〉 are consistent independent
aggregation mechanism for this agenda gives us the result.
7.3 Extending to δ-independence Results
Theorem 7.4.
If
there exists a function δ(ǫ, n) s.t. for any ǫ > 0 and n > 1, if F is an aggregation mechanism for X over
n voters satisfying independence and IC(F )6δ(ǫ), then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that
satisfies consistency and independence such that d(F,G)<ǫ.
Then,
for any ǫ > 0 and n > 1, there exist δ
IC
, δ
DI
> 0, such that if F is an aggregation mechanism for X over
n voters satisfying IC(F ) 6 δ
IC
and DI(F ) 6 δ
DI
, then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that
satisfies consistency and independence such that d(F,G) < ǫ.
Moreover, one can take δ
IC
= δ ((1− βǫ) ǫ)− βǫǫ and δDI =
1
2mβǫǫ for any βǫ ∈ [0, 1] satisfying
δ ((1− βǫ) ǫ) > βǫǫ
In order to extend the results for the δ-dependent case (DI(F ) 6= 0) we prove the following agenda-
independent proposition.
Proposition (Proposition 2.5). Let F be an aggregation mechanism for an agenda over m issues that sat-
isfies DI(F ) 6 δ. Then there exists an independent aggregation mechanism H that satisfies d(F,H) 6 2mδ.
I.e., if F is δ-independent we can find a close consistent aggregation mechanism H and since it is close
we can deduce bounds on the proximity of F to the consistent and independent aggregation mechanisms
from bounds on this proximity of H. Similarly, since H is close to F , we can deduce that if F is δ-consistent
than H is δ′-consistent for δ′ close to δ. Combining these we get the theorem.
8 Summary and Future Work
In this paper we defined the issue of approximate aggregation which is a generalization of the study of
aggregation mechanisms that satisfy consistency and independence. We defined measures for the relaxation
of the consistency constraint (inconsistency index IC) and for the relaxation of the independence constraint
(dependency index DI). To our knowledge, this is the first time this question is stated in its general form.
We proved that relaxing these constraints does not extend the set of satisfying aggregation mechanisms
in a non-trivial way for any truth-functional agenda in which every conclusion is either conjunction or xor
up to negation of inputs or output. We saw that every conclusion of two premises can be stated as such.
We also saw that any affine agenda can be represented as truth-functional agenda with xor conclusions only
and derived a better approximate aggregation characterization for this family. Particulary we calculated the
dependency between the extension of this class (ǫ) and the inconsistency index (δ(ǫ)) (although probably not
strictly) for two families of truth-functional agendas with one conclusion. The relation we proved includes
dependency on the number of voters (n). In the works that preceded us for preference agendas ([24], [35],
[25]) the relation did not include such a dependency. An interesting question is whether such a dependency
is inherent for conjunction agendas or whether it is possible to prove a relation that does not depend on n.
A major assumption in this paper is the uniform distribution over the inputs which is equivalent to
assuming i.i.d uniform distribution over the premises. We think that our results can be extended for other
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distributions (still assuming voters’ opinions are distributed i.i.d) over the space over premises’ opinions
which seem more realistic.
Immediate extensions for this work can be to extend our result to more complex truth-functional agendas
and generalize our results to non-truth-functional agendas to get a result unifying our work and Kalai, Mossel,
and Keller’s works for the preference agenda.
A major open question is whether one can find an agenda for which relaxing the constraints of indepen-
dence and consistency extends the class of satisfying aggregation mechanisms in a non-trivial way.
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A Lemmas Proof - General
A.1 Propositions A.1,A.3
For a given pair of independent aggregation mechanisms, the following propositions connect between the
pairwise distance between respective issue-aggregating functions (which we found easier to analyze in most
cases) and both the distance between the mechanisms and the inconsistency indices of them.
Proposition A.1.
For any agenda X of m issues and any voting functions
f1, . . . , fm, g1, . . . , gm, : {0, 1}n → {0, 1},
dX(
〈
f1, . . . , fm
〉
,
〈
g1, . . . , gm
〉
) 6
m∑
j=1
Pr
[
f j(Xj) 6= gj(Xj) | X ∈ Xn
]
.
Proof of Proposition . Direct use of the union-bound inequality.
Proposition A.2.
For any agenda X of m issues and voting functions f1, . . . , fm, g1 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1},∣∣∣ICX(〈f1, f2, . . . , fm〉)− ICX(〈g1, f2, . . . , fm〉)∣∣∣ 6 Pr[f1(X1) 6= g1(X1) | X ∈ Xn].
Proof of Proposition .
IC(
〈
f1, . . . , fm
〉
) = Pr
[(
f1(X1), f2(X2), . . . , fm(Xm)
)
/∈ X | X ∈ Xn
]
6 Pr[f1(X1) 6= g1(X1) | X ∈ Xn]
+Pr
[(
f1(X1), . . . , fm(Xm)
)
/∈ X
∧
f1(x) = g1(x) | X ∈ Xn
]
6 Pr[f1(X1) 6= g1(X1) | X ∈ Xn]
+Pr
[(
g1(X1), f2(X2), . . . , fm(Xm)
)
/∈ X | X ∈ Xn
]
= ICX(
〈
g1, . . . , fm
〉
) + Pr[f1(X1) 6= g1(X1) | X ∈ Xn]
Hence, IC(f, g, h)− IC(f ′, g, h) 6 Pr[f1(X1) 6= g1(X1) | X ∈ Xn].
Similarly we can prove that IC(f ′, g, h) − IC(f, g, h) 6 Pr[f1(X1) 6= g1(X1) | X ∈ Xn].
As a corollary of the above we get
Proposition A.3.
For any agenda X of m issues and any voting functions
f1, . . . , fm, g1, . . . , gm, : {0, 1}n → {0, 1},∣∣∣ICX(〈f1, . . . , fm〉)− ICX(〈g1, . . . , gm〉)∣∣∣ 6 m∑
j=1
Pr
[
f j(Xj) 6= gj(Xj) | X ∈ Xn
]
.
A.2 Proposition 2.4
Proposition.
Let F be an aggregation mechanism and j an issue. If DIj(F ) 6 ǫ, then there exists an aggregation mecha-
nism H that satisfies DIj(H) = 0 and d(F,H) 6 2ǫ. If DIj(F ) > ǫ, then every aggregation mechanism H
that satisfies DIj(H) = 0, also satisfies d(F,H) > 12ǫ
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Proof of Proposition .
With no loss of generality assume that j = 1.
• Let F be an aggregation mechanism. We define the functions G1, . . . , Gm : Xn → {0, 1} by:
G1(X) =
{
1 Pr
Y ∈Xn
[
(F (X))1 = 1 | Y 1 = X1
]
> 12
0 otherwise
j = 2, . . . ,m Gj(X) = (F (X))j
and an aggregation mechanism G(X) =
〈
G1(X), . . . , Gm(X)
〉
. Clearly DI1(G) = 0.
d(F,G) = Pr
X∈Xn
[
(F (X))1 6= G1(X)
]
= Pr
X∈Xn
[
Pr
Y ∈Xn
[
(F (X))1 6= (F (Y ))1|X1 = Y 1
]
> 12
]
6 2 E
X∈Xn
[
Pr
Y ∈Xn
[
(F (X))1 6= (F (Y ))1|X1 = Y 1
]]
= 2DI1(F )
• Let F be an aggregation mechanism that is ǫ-close to satisfy DI1(F ) = 0. That is, we can find an
aggregation mechanism G such that d(F,G) 6 ǫ and DI1(G) = 0.
DI1(F ) = E
X∈Xn
[
Pr
Y ∈Xn
[
(F (X))1 6= (F (Y ))1|X1 = Y 1
]]
6 Pr[F (X) 6= G(X)] +
∑
X:F (X)=G(X)
Pr
Y ∈Xn
[
(G(X))1 6= (F (Y ))1|X1 = Y 1
]
6 ǫ+
∑
X:F (X)=G(X)
Pr
Z∈Xn
[Z = X] Pr
Y ∈Xn
[
(G(Y ))1 6= (F (Y ))1|X1 = Y 1
]
6 2ǫ
A.3 Proposition 2.5
Proposition.
Let F be an aggregation mechanism for an agenda over m issues that satisfies DI(F ) 6 δ. Then there exists
an independent aggregation mechanism H that satisfies d(F,H) 6 2mδ.
Proof of Proposition .
We define issue aggregating functions f1, . . . , fm : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} by:
f j(t) =
{
1 Pr
X∈Xn
[
Gj(X) = 1 | Xj = t
]
>
1
2
0 otherwise
and an (independent) aggregation mechanism F =
〈
f1, . . . , fm
〉
.
d(F,G) = Pr
X∈Xn
[F (X) 6= G(X)]
6
m∑
j=1
Pr
X∈Xn
[
F j(X) 6= Gj(X)
]
=
m∑
j=1
Pr
X∈Xn
[
Pr
Y ∈Xn
[
G(X) 6= G(Y )|Xj = Y j
]
> 12
]
6
m∑
j=1
2 E
X∈Xn
[
Pr
Y ∈Xn
[
G(X) 6= G(Y )|Xj = Y j
]]
6 2mδ
DI
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A.4 Id Agenda
For completeness we add here an approximate aggregation theorem for the id agenda 〈A,A〉
Theorem A.4.
For any ǫ > 0 and any independent aggregation mechanism F :
If IC〈A,A〉 6 ǫ, then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satisfies consistency and independence
such that d(F,G) 6 ǫ.
Proof. This theorem is trivial since
IC〈A,A〉(〈f, g〉) = Pr [f(x) 6= g(y) | x = y] = Pr [f(x) 6= g(x)] = d(f, g)
Noticing that any aggregation mechanism of the form 〈f, f〉 is consistent for this agenda so we get the
theorem.
B Lemmas Proof - Conjunction agenda
B.1 Theorem 7.1
Theorem.
Let m > 2 and let the agenda be X =
〈
A1, . . . , Am,
m
∧
j=1
Aj
〉
.
For any ǫ > 0 and any independent aggregation mechanism F :
If IC(F ) 6 ǫ, then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satisfies consistency and independence
such that d(F,G) < 5m
(
n2ǫ
) 1
m2+m−1 .
Proof.
For proving this bound, we define for a given function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and a coalition J (the junta), the
junta function f→J : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}. It is derived from f in the following way:
f→J(x) = majority {f(y) | yJ = xJ} .
I.e., for a given input, f→J reads only the votes of the junta members, iterates over all the possible votes for
the members outside the junta, and returns the more frequent result (assuming uniform distribution over
the votes of the voters outside J).
We prove the following lemma:
Lemma B.1.
Let f1, . . . , fm : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be m voting functions. Define
I˜C(f1, . . . , fm) = min
h
IC
〈
A1,...,Am,
m
∧
j=1
Aj
〉
(f1, . . . , fm, h).
If there exists constants ∆ and ǫ such that:
⋆ I˜C(f1, . . . , fm) 6 ǫ
⋆ ∀j : d(f j, 0) > ∆
⋆ ǫ < 2−m
2−3m−1n−2∆m
2+m−1
Then there exist a coalition J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that the junta functions f j→J satisfy
⋆ There exists an oligarchy g ∈ Olig s.t. ∀j f j→J = g
⋆ ∀j : d(f j, f j→J) 6 4n
2ǫ∆1−m
⋆ |J | 6 m
(
1 + log2
1
∆
)
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The requested bound is a corollary of lemma B.1.
Assume a mechanism F =
〈
f1, . . . , fm, h
〉
is given such that IC(F ) 6 ǫ. Then I˜C(f1, . . . , fm) 6 ǫ.
Define ∆ = 4
(
n2ǫ
) 1
m2+m−1 . If there exists j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (with no loss of generality assume j = 1)
s.t. d(f j, 0) < ∆, then
〈
f1, f2, . . . , fm, h
〉
is ∆-close to F =
〈
0, f2, . . . , fm, h
〉
and (ǫ+∆)-close
to F =
〈
0, f2, . . . , fm, 0
〉
which is a consistent mechanism. If ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} d(f j , 0) > ∆, then〈
f1, f2, . . . , fm, h
〉
is 4mn2ǫ∆1−m-close to 〈g, . . . , g, h〉 for some oligarchy g and
(
ǫ+ 4mn2ǫ∆1−m
)
-close to
〈g, . . . , g, g〉 which is a consistent mechanism. Since max(ǫ+∆, ǫ+ 4mn2ǫ∆1−m) 6 5m
(
n2ǫ
) 1
m2+m−1 (when
n2ǫ < 1), we get the theorem.
B.2 Lemma B.1
Lemma.
Let f1, . . . , fm : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be m voting functions. Define
I˜C(f1, . . . , fm) = min
h
IC
〈
A1,...,Am,
m
∧
j=1
Aj
〉
(f1, . . . , fm, h).
If there exists constants ∆ and ǫ such that:
⋆ I˜C(f1, . . . , fm) 6 ǫ
⋆ ∀j : d(f j, 0) > ∆
⋆ ǫ < 2−m
2−3m−1n−2∆m
2+m−1
Then there exist a coalition J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that the junta functions f j→J satisfy
⋆ There exists an oligarchy g ∈ Olig s.t. ∀j f j→J = g
⋆ ∀j : d(f j, f j→J) 6 4n
2ǫ∆1−m
⋆ |J | 6 m
(
1 + log2
1
∆
)
Proof of Lemma .
The proof of the lemma is constructive and defines the junta J . We define the junta to be all the voters
with small ignorability for at least one of the functions
J =
m⋃
j=1
{
i Pi(f
j) 6 ∆n
}
and prove for this junta the different claims of the lemma.
• ∀j : d(f j, f j→J) 6 4n
2ǫ∆1−m
The following lemma states a connection between the influence of the voter on f(Ii(f)), the ignorability
of the same voter for g(Pi(g)), and the inconsistency index of f and g.
Lemma B.2. Let f1, . . . , fm : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be m voting functions , i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be a voter, and
k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} two different issues. Then Pi(f
k) · Ii(f
l) 6 4
( ∏
j 6=k,l
d(f j , 0)
)−1
I˜C(f1, . . . , fm)
Using this lemma, we can bound the influence of the voters outside the Junta by Ii(f) 6 4nǫ∆
1−m.
Since all these voters have small influence, the function f→J cannot be too far from the original
function f .
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Lemma B.3. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a binary function and J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} a coalition. Then
d(f, f→J) 6
∑
i/∈J
Ii(f).
Combining both gives us the desired bound.
• |J | 6 m
(
1 + log2
1
∆
)
Since f is ∆-far from zero we can bound the number of voters that have small ignorability.
Lemma B.4. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a voting function. If d(f, 0) > ∆ then at most
(
1 + log2
1
∆
)
voters have the property: Pi(f) 6
∆
n .
• f→J = g→J ∈ Olig
Both f→J and g→J depend on a small number of voters so the inconsistency index has large granularity
Lemma B.5. Let f1, . . . , fm : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be m voting functions that depend only on the votes
of the members of J . Then there exists an integer C s.t. I˜C(f, g) = C · 2−m|J |.
So if we show that
ǫ+
m∑
j=1
d(f j , f j→J) < 2
−m|J |
then we get that I˜C(f→J , g→J) = 0 and based on lemma 7.2 we get that there exists an oligarchy of
a sub-coalition of J g s.t. ∀j f j→J = g. Notice that f
j
→J cannot be the constant zero function for any
j since d(f j , 0) > ∆ and d(f, f j→J) 6 4n
2∆1−m 6 2−m
2−1m−1∆m
2
< ∆.
ǫ+
m∑
j=1
d(f j, f j→J) 6 ǫ
(
1 + 4mn2∆1−m
)
6 8mn2ǫ∆1−m < 2−m
2
∆m
2
6 2−m|J | .
B.3 Lemma B.2
Lemma.
Let f1, . . . , fm : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be m voting functions , i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be a voter, and k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} two
different issues. Then Pi(f
k) · Ii(f
l) 6 4
( ∏
j 6=k,l
d(f j , 0)
)−1
I˜C(f1, . . . , fm)
Proof of Lemma .
Let h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a voting function s.t. IC(f1, . . . , fM , h) = I˜C(f1, . . . , fm).
(We use the notation x⊕ ei for adding ei (the i
th elementary vector) which is equivalent to flipping the ith
bit 0↔ 1)
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I˜C(f1, . . . , fm) = IC(f1, . . . , fM , h)
= Pr
[
m∧
j=1
f j(xj) 6= h
(
m∧
j=1
xj
)]
= Pr[
(
xk
)
i
= 0]
∏
j 6=k,l
Pr[f j(xj) = 1] · Pr
[
m∧
j=1
f j(xj) 6= h
(
m∧
j=1
xj
) (
xk
)
i
= 0
∀j 6= k, l : f j(xj) = 1
]
= 12
∏
j 6=k,l
d(f j , 0) · Pr
[
fk(xk) ∧ f l(xl) 6= h
(
m∧
j=1
xj
) (
xk
)
i
= 0
∀j 6= k, l : f j(xj) = 1
]
> 12
∏
j 6=k,l
d(f j , 0) · 12 · Pr

fk(xk) ∧ f l(xl) 6= h
(∧
j 6=l
xj ∧ xl
)
∨
fk(xk) ∧ f l(xl⊕ ei) 6= h
(∧
j 6=l
xj ∧ (xl⊕ ei)
) (xk)i = 0∀j 6= k, l : f j(xj) = 1

>
1
4
∏
j 6=k,l
d(f j , 0) · Pr
[
fk(xk) ∧ f l(xl) 6= fk(xk) ∧ f l(xl⊕ ei)
(
xk
)
i
= 0
∀j 6= k, l : f j(xj) = 1
]
>
1
4
∏
j 6=k,l
d(f j , 0) · Pr
[
fk(xk) = 1
f l(xl) 6= f l(xl⊕ ei)
(
xk
)
i
= 0
∀j 6= k, l : f j(xj) = 1
]
= 14
∏
j 6=k,l
d(f j , 0) · Pi(f
k)Ii(f
l)
B.4 Lemma B.3
Lemma.
Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a binary function and J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} a coalition. Then d(f, f→J) 6
∑
i/∈J
Ii(f).
Proof of Lemma .
We define for a vector c ∈ {0, 1}J the function fJc : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1} by fJc (x) = f(y) where yJ = c and
y
−J
= x
−J
. Assume that ci is sampled according to p. Then f→J(xJ , x−J ) =
{
0 Ec[f
J
c (x)] <
1
2
1 Ec[f
J
c (x)] >
1
2
We will use the following isoperimetric inequality on the boolean cube:
Proposition (The Isoperimetric Inequality for The Boolean Cube [5]).
Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a boolean function. Then
∑
i
Ii(f) > min(E[f ], 1− E[f ]).
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For any c ∈ {0, 1}J :
∑
i/∈J
Ii(f
J
c ) =
∑
i
Ii(f
J
c )
> min(E[fJc ], 1− E[f
J
c ])
For i /∈ J : Ii(f) = Pr[f(x) 6= f(x⊕ ei)]
= Ec
[
Pr[fJc (x) 6= f
J
c (x⊕ ei)]
]
= Ec
[
Ii(f
J
c )
]
Ec
[∑
i/∈J
Ii(f
J
c )
]
=
∑
i/∈J
Ec
[
Ii(f
J
c )
]
=
∑
i/∈J
Ii(f)
Ec
[∑
i/∈J
Ii(f
J
c )
]
> Ec
[
min
(
E
[
fJc
]
, 1− E
[
fJc
])]
= Pr[f→J(x) 6= f(x)]
= d(f→J , f)
d(f, f→J) 6
∑
i/∈J
Ii(f)
B.5 Lemma B.4
Lemma.
Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a voting function. If d(f, 0) > ∆ then at most
(
1 + log2
1
∆
)
voters have the
property: Pi(f) 6
∆
n .
Proof of Lemma .
Define J = {i | Pi(f) 6
∆
n }. Then:
Pr[f(x) = 1] 6 Pr[x
J
= 1¯] +
∑
i∈J
Pr[f(x) = 1 | xi 6= 1] · Pr[xi 6= 1]
6 2−|J | +
∑
i∈J
1
2 · Pi(f)
6 2−|J | + |J |2
∆
n
6 2−|J | + ∆2
∆ 6 2−|J | + ∆2
|J | 6 1 + log2
1
∆
B.6 Lemma B.5
Lemma.
Let f1, . . . , fm : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be m voting functions that depend only on the votes of the members of J .
Then there exists an integer C s.t. I˜C(f, g) = C · 2−m|J |.
Proof of Lemma .
Let h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a voting function s.t. IC(f1, . . . , fM , h) = I˜C(f1, . . . , fm). Then,
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I˜C(f1, . . . , fm) = Pr
[
m∧
j=1
f j(xj) 6= h
(
m∧
j=1
xj
)]
=
∑
c1,...,cm∈{0,1}J
m∏
j=1
Pr
[(
xj
)
J
= cj
]
· Pr
[
m∧
j=1
f j(xj) 6= h
(
m∧
j=1
xj
)
|∀j
(
xj
)
J
= cj
]
= 2−m|J |#
{
c1, . . . , cm ∈ {0, 1}n |
(
m∧
j=1
f j(xj) 6= h
(
m∧
j=1
xj
))∧(
∀j
(
xj
)
J
= 0¯
)}
B.7 Lemma 7.2
Lemma.
Let f1, . . . , fm, h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be m+ 1 voting functions satisfying IC(
〈
f1, . . . , fm, h
〉
) = 0. Then ei-
ther there exists an issue j s.t. f j = h ≡ 0 or f1 = f2 = . . . = fm = h ∈ Olig.
Proof of Lemma .
Assume that for issues j, f j is not the constant zero function. We will prove that f1=f2= . . .=fm=h ∈ Olig
by proving the following series of claims.
• For all issues j f j(1¯) = 1
With no loss of generality, assume for contraction that f1(1¯) = 0. Let x ∈ {0, 1}n. Then
h(x) = h
1¯ ∧
 m∧
j=2
x
 = f1 (1¯) ∧
 m∧
j=2
f j (x)
 = 0.
I.e. h ≡ 0. From that we can conclude that there exists an issue j s.t. f j ≡ 0 and get a contradiction.
• For all issues j f j = h
We will prove that f1 = h. The proof is similar for all j.
Let x ∈ {0, 1}n. Then h(x) = h
(
x ∧
(
m∧
j=2
1¯
))
= f1 (x) ∧
(
m∧
j=2
f j (1¯)
)
= f1(x)
• f1 ∈ Olig
Let J = {i | Ii(f
1) 6= 0}. Then f1 is a function of {xi}i∈J . Based on lemma B.2, for i ∈ J Pi(f
1) = 0
and hence
[
xi = 0 ⇒ f
1(x) = 0
]
. So we get that f1 is the oligarchy of J .
C Lemmas Proof - XOR agenda
C.1 Theorem 7.3
Theorem.
Let m > 3 and let the agenda be X =
〈
A1, . . . , Am−1,
m−1
⊕
j=1
Aj
〉
.
For any ǫ< 16 and any independent aggregation mechanism F : If IC(F )6ǫ, then there exists an aggre-
gation mechanism G that satisfies consistency and independence such that d(F,G)6mǫ.
Proof.
The theorem is a corollary of the following lemma:
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(We rename the values from {0, 1} to {1,−1} in order to ease the analysis (use multiplication instead of
xor) and in particular use the Fourier transformation for f, g, h.23 )
Lemma C.1. Let f1, . . . , fm : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} three voting functions and ǫ a constant such that
Pr
[
m−1∏
i=1
f i(xi) 6= fm(
m−1∏
i=1
xi)
]
6 ǫ
Then,
• There exists a linear function χ : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} defined as χ(x) =
∏
i∈S
xi for some coalition S
and signs
(
ai
)
i=1,...,m
∈ {−1, 1} such that
m∏
i=1
ai = 1
d(f1, a1χ) 6ǫ
∀i : d(f i, aiχ) 62ǫ
• If ǫ < 16 , then there exists a linear function χ : {−1, 1}
n → {−1, 1} defined as χ(x) =
∏
i∈S
xi for some
coalition S and signs
(
aj
)
j=1,...,m
∈ {−1, 1} such that
m∏
j=1
aj = 1 and d(f j , ajχ) 6 ǫ for all j
Noticing that
〈(
ajχ
)〉
is a consistent mechanism for any linear function χ and signs aj s.t.
m∏
j=1
aj = 1
gives us the requested result by applying proposition A.1.
Proof of Lemma C.1.
The main ingredient in the proof is the following lemma that connects the inconsistency index with a simple
expression over the Fourier coefficients of f j.
Lemma C.2. Let f1, . . . , fm : {−1, 1}n → ℜ. Then: E
[
m−1∏
j=1
f j
(
xj
)
fm
(
m−1∏
j=1
xj
)]
=
∑
S
m∏
j=1
f̂ j(S).
Corollary C.3. For the aggregation mechanism F =
〈
f1, . . . , fm
〉
:
1− 2IC(F ) =
∑
S
m∏
j=1
f̂ j(S).
23Fourier transforms are widely used in mathematics, computer science, and engineering. The main idea is representing the
function f over an orthonormal basis χ
S
when the inner product is define to be 〈f, g〉 = E[f(x)g(x)] and the basis vectors χS
are defined to be χ
S
(x) =
∏
i∈S
xi for S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. The coefficients of f according to the Fourier basis are notated f̂(S). I.e.,
f ≡
∑
S
f̂(S)χ
S
. For a good introduction to the subject see [38], [11].
In this proof we are using the following:
• χ
S
(xy) = χ
S
(x)χ
S
(y)
• E[χS (x)χT (x)] =
{
1 S = T
0 otherwise
• E[f
2(x)] =
∑
S
f̂2(S)
• f̂(S) = 1− 2d(f, χ
S
) = 2d(f,−χ
S
)− 1
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Now let F =
〈
f1, . . . , fm
〉
be an independent aggregation mechanism that satisfies IC(F ) 6 ǫ.
First we claim there exists a coalition A and a sign a1 ∈ {−1, 1} s.t. d
(
f1, aχ
A
)
6 ǫ
1− 2IC(F ) =
∑
S
m∏
j=1
f̂ j(S) 6
∑
S
∣∣∣f̂1(S)∣∣∣ · ∣∣∣∣∣ m∏j=2 f̂ j(S)
∣∣∣∣∣
6 max
S
∣∣∣f̂1(S)∣∣∣∑
S
m∏
j=2
∣∣∣f̂ j(S)∣∣∣ 6Lemma C.4 max
S
∣∣∣f̂1∣∣∣ m∏
j=2
√∑
S
∣∣∣f̂ jm−1(S)∣∣∣
6 max
S
∣∣∣f̂1∣∣∣ m∏
j=2
√∑
S
f̂ j
2
(S) = max
S
∣∣∣f̂1∣∣∣ = 1− 2 min
S,a∈{−1,1}
(
d
(
f1, aχ
S
))
and hence there exists a coalition A and a sign a1 s.t. Pr[f1(x) 6= a1χ
A
(x)] 6 IC(f, g, h) = ǫ.
Based on proposition A.3, IC(a1χ
A
, f2, . . . , fm) 6 IC(F ) + d(f, a1χ
A
) 6 2ǫ. On the other hand based
on corollary
IC(a1χ
A
, f2, . . . , fm) =
1
2
1− a1∑
S
χ̂
A
(S)
m∏
j=2
f̂ j(S)
 = 1
2
1− a1 m∏
j=2
f̂ j(A)
 .
So we get that a1
m∏
j=2
f̂ j(A) > 1− 4ǫ
and hence there exist signs (aj)mj=1 such that
m∏
j=2
aj = 1 and aj f̂ j(A) > 1− 4ǫ so d(f j, ajχ
A
) 6 2ǫ.
Due to symmetry there is also a coalition B and a sign b2 such that d(f2, b2χ
B
) 6 ǫ and hence
d(b2χ
B
, a2χ
A
) 6 3ǫ. On the other hand d(b2χ
B
, a2χ
A
) =

0 a2 = b2 ∧A = B
1 a2 = b2 ∧A = B
1
2 A 6= B
.
Hence, if ǫ < 16 , we get that A = B, a
2 = b2.
Due to symmetry we can repeat this for all f j.
C.2 Lemma C.2
Lemma.
Let f1, . . . , fm : {−1, 1}n → ℜ. Then: E
[
m−1∏
j=1
f j
(
xj
)
fm
(
m−1∏
j=1
xj
)]
=
∑
S
m∏
j=1
f̂ j(S).
Proof of Lemma .
Ex,y[f(x)g(y)h(xy)] = Ex,y
[ ∑
S,T,R
f̂(S)χ
S
(x)ĝ(T )χ
T
(y)ĥ(R)χ
R
(xy)
]
=
∑
S,T,R
f̂(S)ĝ(T )ĥ(R)E[χS (x)χR(x)]E[χT (y)χR(y)]
=
∑
S
f̂(S)ĝ(S)ĥ(S)
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C.3 Lemma C.4
Lemma C.4.
Let k > 2 be an integer and {ai,j}i=1...n,j=1...k positive reals. Then, n∑
i=1
k∏
j=1
ai,j
k 6 k∏
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
(ai,j)
k
)
Proof of Lemma .
• Let x1, . . . , xk > 0 and p1, . . . , pk s.t.
∑
pj = 1 then
∏
x
pj
j 6
∑
pjxj .
−log(x) is convex and hence −log(
∑
pjxj) 6 −
∑
pjlog(xj) = −log(
∏
x
pj
j ). −log(x) is downward
monotone and hence
∑
pjxj >
∏
x
pj
j .
• Let y1, . . . , yk > 0 and q1, . . . , qk s.t.
∑ 1
qj
= 1 then
∏
yj 6
∑ yqjj
qj
.
Assign xj ← y
qj
j and pj ←
1
qj
in the former.
• Let qj, . . . , qk s.t.
∑ 1
qj
= 1 and assume ∀j :
n∑
i=1
a
qj
i,j = 1. Then
n∑
i=1
∏k
j=1 ai,j 6
k∏
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
(ai,j)
qj
) 1
qj
n∑
i=1
∏k
j=1 ai,j 6
n∑
i=1
∑k
j=1
a
qj
i,j
qj
=
∑k
j=1
n∑
i=1
a
qj
i,j
qj
=
∑k
j=1
1
qj
= 1
=
k∏
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
(ai,j)
qj
) 1
qj
• Let q1, . . . , qk s.t.
∑ 1
qi
= 1. Then
n∑
i=1
∏k
j=1 ai,j 6
k∏
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
(ai,j)
qj
) 1
qj
Normalize each vector. (The case of zero is trivial)
•
(
n∑
i=1
∏k
j=1 ai,j
)k
6
k∏
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
(ai,j)
k
)
Take qi = k
C.4 Affine Agenda - Lemma C.5
Lemma C.5. Let X be an affine subspace of {0, 1}m of degree k.
Then X can be represented as a truth-functional agenda using xor conclusions only.
Proof of Lemma .
X is an affine space and therefore can be represented as a linear subspace shifted by a constant vector.
Shifting is merely renaming of the opinions so with no loss of generality, assume that X is a linear subspace
defined by a matrix Ak×m of rank k in the following way X = {x ∈ {0, 1}
m | Ax = 0}. There exists an
invertible matrix (representing the Gaussian elimination process) P s.t.
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• {x ∈ {0, 1}m | Ax = 0} = {x ∈ {0, 1}m | PAx = 0}
• PA is in canonical form. I.e. for any row t ∈ [k] there is a unique index at ∈ [m] s.t. (PA)t,j = 1 iff
j = at.
Hence X is a truth-functional agenda for the premises [m] \ {at}t∈[k] and conclusions based on the row of
PA.
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